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After the Hurricane: The Legacy of
the Rubin Carter Case
JUDITH L. RITTER*
Introduction
Rubin "Hurricane" Carter was a top middleweight boxing
contender in the early 1960s. 1 Carter, twice convicted of a triple
homicide in New Jersey and sentenced to three life sentences, was
released after almost nineteen years in prison when a federal court
found that his convictions were obtained in violation of his
constitutional rights.2 After his release and ultimate exoneration,
3
Rubin Carter devoted himself to assisting others who were falsely
accused and unjustly incarcerated.4 This past spring he died of
* Professor of Law, Widener University School of Law. I wish to thank Mary Paige
Valeski for her valuable research assistance.
1. See, e.g., PAUL B. WICE, RUBIN "HURRICANE" CARTER AND THE AMERICAN JUSTICE
SYSTEM 33-38 (2000) (setting forth Carter's boxing career); Rubin "Hurricane" Carter - The
Boxer, BOXING INSIDER, Feb. 28, 2011, available at boxinginsider.com/history/rubin-
hurricane-carter-the-boxer; Ron Flatter, Story of Hurricane, ESPN (Aug. 18, 2014),
http://espn.go.com/classic/000731hurricanecarter.html.
2. On November 7, 1985, Judge H. Lee Sarokin of the Federal District Court of New
Jersey granted Rubin Carter's petition for a writ of habeas corpus, thereby setting aside
his three murder convictions. Carter v. Dietz, 621 F. Supp. 533, 559 (D.N.J. 1985). Over
the objection of the prosecutor who told the court that it would be appealing the case to
the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, the day after he issued his decision, Judge Sarokin
agreed to release Carter pending any appeals. See WICE, supra note 1, at 185.
3. The government's appeal to the Third Circuit and its petition for certiorari filed in the
United States Supreme Court were both denied. Carter v. Rafferty, 826 F.2d 1299 (3d Cir.
1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1011 (1988). Faced with the decision of whether or not to try Carter
a third time, the Passaic County prosecutor decided against it and on February 19, 1988,
moved to dismiss the indictments against both Carter and John Artis, his codefendant. See
WICE, supra note 1, at 188. As discussed in more depth infra, the federal writ was granted due
to violations of the petitioners' due process rights. It is well worth noting, however, that in a
1998 speech, Judge Sarokin said about his decision in Carter, "although unnecessary to my
decision, I also concluded that he was probably innocent." H. Lee Sarokin, Thwarting the Will
of the Majority, 20 WHITrIER L. REv. 171,173 (1998).
4. Rubin Carter was the first Executive Director of the Association in Defense of the
Wrongly Convicted. See Steve Almasy & Eliott C. McLaughlin, Rubin 'Hurricane' Carter,
HASTINGS RACE & POVERTY LAW JOURNAL
cancer at the age of seventy-six.5
Just two months before his death, Carter wrote an opinion piece
published by the New York Daily News, in which he asked the Brooklyn
District Attorney to review and reconsider the conviction of David
McCallum, an inmate incarcerated since 1985 for a crime Carter and
others maintained he did not commit.6 Writing about Carter's death in
The Nation, columnist David Zirin proposed that the best tribute to
Carter would be for his supporters to call the Brooklyn District
Attorney to advocate for David McCallum's release.7
In this essay, I suggest that Hurricane's legacy should have broad
implications. A federal court set aside Rubin Carter's conviction in
1985,8 eleven years before the passage of the Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act (hereinafter "AEDPA").9 Had AEDPA
been the law in 1985, Carter would not have been freed. He would
have died in prison after serving nearly forty-eight years for a crime he
did not commit. Because of AEDPA, there is a grave risk that
individuals wrongfully convicted in state courts-the Rubin Carters of
today -have little hope for meaningful review by a federal court.
After a brief description of Rubin Carter's life before he was
accused of murder, a synopsis of the Carter prosecution, and a
Boxer Wrongly Convicted of Murder, Dies, CNN (Apr. 20, 2014), http://www .cnn.com/2014/
04/20/us/rubin-hurricane-carter-obit/; Stephen B. Bright, Is Fairness Irrelevant?: The
Evisceration of Federal Habeas Corpus Review and Limits on the Ability of State Courts to Protect
Fundamental Rights, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1, 6 (1997) (referring to Rubin Carter as, "one of
the most eloquent spokesmen in support of the writ of habeas corpus").
5. See Almasy & McLaughlin, supra note 4.
6. Rubin Carter, Hurricane Carter's Dying Wish, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Feb. 21, 2014),
http://www.nydailynews.com/opinion/hurricane-carter-dying-article-1.1621747
(Carter addressed his plea to the Brooklyn District Attorney and its new Conviction
Integrity Unit. Recently, District Attorney Offices nationwide have created internal units
charged with the task of reviewing convictions after receiving claims that the convicted
defendant is actually innocent); see e.g., Conviction Review Bureau, N.Y. STATE OFFICE OF
THE ATFORNEY GEN., http://www.ag.ny.gov/bureau/conviction-review-bureau (last
visited Aug. 18, 2014); Rachel Dissell, New Conviction Review Unit, CLEVELAND.COM (Apr.
19, 2014), http://www.cleveland.com/court-justice/index.ssf/2014/04/new-conviction
_integrity-unit.html; See also A Symposium on the Death Penalty, 23 HOFSTRA L. REV. 627,
634-35 (1995) (comments of Leon Friedman) (describing conviction review procedures in
Great Britain and Canada).
7. David Zirin, On the Death and Life's Work of the Unconquerable Rubin "Hurricane" Carter,
THE NATION (Apr. 20, 2014), http://www.thenation.com/blog/179431/death-and-lifes-
work-unconquerable-rubin-hurricane-carter. On October 15, 2014, David McCallum was
exonerated and freed after 29 years behind bars. Wrongfully Convicted Brooklyn Man Goes Free,
N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Oct. 15,2014), http://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/brooklyn/brook
lyn-da-slams-predecessor-record-wrongful-convictions-article-1.1975298.
8. Carter v. Dietz, 621 F. Supp. at 559.




discussion of the court opinion that led to his freedom, this essay
will explain the harsh truth that Carter could never have been
released under current federal habeas corpus law. In this essay I
argue that it is the perfect time to reformulate habeas law. As the
Supreme Court's interpretation of the right to habeas corpus relief
grows increasingly narrow, the death of Rubin Carter and the
memories of his life story call to mind the human impact of unjust
criminal convictions. 10
I. Rubin Carter, Before June 17,1966
Rubin Carter's contacts with the criminal justice system began
well before he was wrongfully accused of murder. Carter was
twenty-nine years old when he was indicted for the triple
homicide.11 Up to that point, he had spent a significant part of his
life in juvenile or adult criminal detention centers.1 2 He was the
fourth child of six, within a stable family unit.13 His father was strict,
however, and viciously beat Carter on more than one occasion. 14
The family moved to Paterson, New Jersey, when Rubin was six
years old.15 Paterson was a rough area and Carter and a few of his
siblings joined a local street gang.16 He was a stutterer from an early
age, which caused Carter to confront those who teased and ridiculed
him and also caused him to talk as little as possible.17 His fellow
gang members quickly noted his aptitude for fighting, leading to his
election as war counselor for the group. 18 The position presented
him with more opportunities to fight, frequently reminding Carter
that he had a knack for it.
10. While perhaps not universally familiar to more recent generations, Rubin
"Hurricane" Carter's ordeal was widely publicized as it was unfolding, due at least in part
to his notoriety as a serious boxing contender. He published his autobiography from
prison after losing his first round of appeals. See RUBIN "HURRICANE" CARTER, THE
SIXTEENTH ROUND: FROM NUMBER 1 CONTENDER TO NUMBER 45472 (1974). Many years
before the Hollywood film THE HURRICANE (Universal Studios 1999), Bob Dylan wrote and
recorded a song about Carter's trial and conviction. See BOB DYLAN, Hurricane, on DESIRE
(Columbia Records 1975) (describing Carter as "an innocent man in a living hell").
11. He was born on May 6, 1937. See CARTER, supra note 10, at 4-5.
12. Id. at 41-184.
13. Id. at 11. Carter's parents were together and his father, Lloyd Carter, was employed
and supported the family. Id. at 12.
14. Id. at 18.
15. Id. at 12.
16. Id. at 13-14.
17. Id. at 15. Carter's stutter was so severe that on many occasions he could not
formulate words at all.
18. Id.
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By age eleven, Carter was placed in a New Jersey state home for
delinquents after being accused of assaulting a white man.19
Although there was evidence that the man forcibly tried to sexually
molest Rubin Carter and his friends, it seemed to make no difference.
20
The detention facility was strictly segregated.21 Racist remarks from
guards, administrators and inmates were commonplace. 22 Carter was
frustrated by this treatment.23 In response, he began forming what
would become a lifetime inclination toward combating unfairness. In
his autobiography, he poignantly commented that the community of
incarcerated juveniles was a group of "mentally abused products of
a morally abusing environment, shamelessly vicious, corrupt, and
depraved. To make matters worse, these were contagious qualities."
24
Confrontations in jail frequently resulted in disciplinary measures
against him.2 After six years at the detention facility, the warden
promised to release Carter upon a showing of good behavior.26
However, when the warden failed to follow through, Carter took
matters into his own hands and successfully managed to escape.
27
Out on his own, Rubin Carter joined the Army and became a
19. CARTER, supra note 10, at 30-32.
20. Id. Carter's description of this encounter is harrowing. He and his friends went to
a local swimming area- a place considered neutral territory for rival gangs and where they
swam and relaxed without confrontation. As they were departing, a white older man
sunbathing nearby tried to lure and then grabbed one of Carter's younger companions.
While defending his friend, Carter scuffled with the man, who at one point nearly threw
Carter off of a dangerously high cliff. Carter stabbed the man with a knife and escaped.
The man was wounded and Carter was taken into the juvenile justice system after being
accused of the assault. Id. at 30-41.
21. Id. at 43.
22. See e.g., id. at 44 (recalling, "Once he had completed the inspection to his
satisfaction, he ordered us to join the twenty or thirty other black inmates who were
standing at the back of the room at attention, stiff as boards, while the white inmates in
the cottage sat around playing cards, laughing and joking and making fun of the
'coons"'); id. at 67 (recounting being admonished, "'See that, nigger!' he shouted. 'Did
you see that?' He kicked the splintered halves of the desk against the wall. 'That's
gonna be your head, you little black sonofabitch! Because I'm coming up those stairs
right now!"').
23. Id. at 78.
24. Id. at 75.
25. Id. at 78.
26. Id. at 87. Despite the fact that Rubin was viewed as a troublemaker, rule-
breaker, and hothead in the institution, the Warden seemed to understand that much of
his 'acting out" was in response to abusive treatment by hostile and racist guards.
Following a fairly serious and violent incident between Carter and his jailors, the
Warden offered to recommend release if Carter could avoid trouble for ninety days.
27. Id. Carter avoided any problems for the full ninety days only to learn at the eleventh
hour that the warden was away and his stand-in, Carter's nemsis at the prison, fabricated a
rule violation thereby preventing his release.
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paratrooper. 28 While stationed in Germany, he boxed regularly and
became the European Light Welterweight Champion.29 At the same
time, he was introduced to the teachings of Islam, which gave him
new insight into his life and conduct.3 0 However, this period of
freedom was short-lived. After being discharged from the Army in
1956 and returning to New Jersey, he was locked up again as a
consequence of his escape from the juvenile detention center.3 1 This
time around, Carter was sent to a facility even more dismal than the
first.32 He remained there for ten months, but was re-incarcerated
shortly after his release when he committed two robberies.33 These
offenses led to his being sent to Trenton State Prison, an old, large,
dilapidated institution, where he would remain for more than four
years.3 4 At Trenton State, Carter spent his days reading and intensely
training for the boxing ring.35 With an improved sense of self-worth,36
an increased knowledge of the world, and an adoption of many of the
tenets of Islam, Rubin Carter left prison in 1961, determined to be self-
sufficient and never return. 37
After prison, Carter ramped up efforts to start a boxing career
but was met with a number of obstacles such as incompetent and
dishonest managers. 38 Nevertheless, by the spring of 1964, Carter
had moved from hastily arranged small-purse bouts to televised
matches in New York's Madison Square Garden, Hawai'i, South
America, and even as far away as South Africa. Soon, he was the
number one middleweight challenger.3 9 With all of this newfound
28. CARTER, supra note 10, at 122.
29. Id. at 133.
30. Id. at 131. He learned about Islamic teachings from an army friend, Ali Hasson
Muhammad. Much of what he and Muhammad discussed resonated with Carter and gave
him new insights into coping with anger and frustration.
31. Id. at 140.
32. Id. at 153.
33. Id. at 157-59.
34. Id. at 158-63.
35. Id. at 165-68; WICE, supra note 1, at 32-33.
36. After winning numerous boxing matches against other prisoners, Carter started
receiving offers from prize fighting managers all over the world. CARTER supra note 10,
at 184. Carter's response to each offer was the same: "If you can get me out, I'm yours."
Id. Even a prison employee offered to manage Carter when he got out. Id.
37. See WICE, supra note 1, at 31.
38. See CARTER, supra note 10, at 202, 221-22. During this period, despite the fact
that Carter fought regularly, he made almost no money. He had shelter, but no heat and
no money for food. Id. at 197. Because of his determination to make something of his
life, he refused his father's offer to return home. Id.
39. Id. at 197; supra note 1 and accompanying text. During this period Carter met
and married Mae Thelma Bosket and together they had a daughter, Theodora. CARTER,
supra note 10, at 220.
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exposure, Rubin Carter began to draw the ire and hostility of local
and federal law enforcement. 40 This stemmed at least in part from
statements attributed to him in the press calling for a militant
response to police oppression of African Americans.41 After this, he
was regularly harassed by resentful members of law enforcement.
42
II. A Triple Homicide, Two Trials and Appellate
Review
For the purposes of this Article, there is no value in
comprehensively laying out details of the triple homicide that took
place in a Paterson, New Jersey, bar in the early morning hours of
June 17, 1966. Nor will I list the witnesses, pieces of evidence or the
many and varying accounts of that night. There are books43 and a
Hollywood movie44 that cover this territory. In this section of the
Article, I will summarize the events and emphasize the pieces most
pertinent to the habeas corpus litigation that led to Carter's freedom.
Three people died45 and a fourth was badly injured 46 when two
gunmen burst into the Lafayette Bar and Grill and started shooting
on June 17, 1966, at 2:25 a.m. 47 Neither of the two surviving victims
was able to identify the perpetrators.48 All of the victims were
white.49 Because no money was taken and neither gunman said
anything before shooting, there was no apparent motive for the
crime.50  Law enforcement officers investigating the shootings
detained Rubin Carter and his codefendant John Artis, both African
American, later that night, mostly because they were seen riding in a
car that loosely fit the description of the getaway vehicle.
51
40. CARTER, supra note 10, at 238-39.
41. Id. at 226 (quoting news coverage of an interview with Carter about ongoing riots,
in which he acknowledged saying to a close friend in jest, "Let's get our guns and go up
there and get us some of those cops. I know I can get four or five before they get me. How
many can you get?").
42. Id. at 238-39.
43. See e.g., SAM CHAITON & TERRY SWINTON, LAZARUS AND THE HURRICANE: THE
FREEING OF RUBIN "HURRICANE" CARTER (2000); JAMES S. HIRSCH, HURRICANE: THE
MIRACULOUS JOURNEY OF RUBIN CARTER (2000).
44. THE HURRICANE (Universal Studios, 1999).
45. Carter v. Dietz, 621 F. Supp. at 535. Bartender Jim Oliver and patron Fred
Nauyoks died at the scene and patron Hazel Tanis who survived that night, died one
month later from her injuries. Id.
46. Another patron, Bill Marins, was shot in the eye and partially blinded. Id.
47. Id. at 534-35.
48. WICE, supra note 1, at 14-16.
49. Id. at 129.
50. Id. at 66.
51. Id. at 7-9.
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However, they were both released shortly thereafter, following a
show-up at the hospital bed of one of the victims, at which time the
victim told the police that Carter and Artis were not the shooters.
52
An investigation and grand jury inquiry followed, culminating in
the re-arrest of both Carter and Artis in October 1966.53 The newly
obtained evidence against Carter and Artis primarily consisted of
the statements of two men, Al Bello and Arthur Bradley, who were
attempting to burglarize an establishment up the street from the bar
on the night of the shootings.5 4 They told the police that they saw
Carter and Artis with firearms, running from The Lafayette. 55 The
grand jury indicted Rubin Carter and John Artis for the murders on
October 30, 1966,56 and both were held in custody to await trial.
Rubin Carter and John Artis stood trial twice for the killings, once
in the spring of 196757 and then again in the fall of 1976.58 Their first
convictions were set aside and a retrial ordered after it was revealed
that the prosecution had failed to disclose to the defendants that both
Bello and Bradley, the only eyewitnesses, were offered leniency for
their own crimes in exchange for their testimony.59 At the second
52. WICE, supra note 1, at 16. If the victim had made a positive identification, it would
have been highly unreliable. Bill Marins had been shot in the face and was missing his left
eye. When Carter and Artis were brought to him at the hospital, Carter remembers that
Matins was "weak, pale, and seemed nearly dead." Id. Yet, when asked, he told a police
detective that he was able to see clearly. He then indicated that neither Carter nor Artis were
the gunmen. Id.
53. Id. at 44.
54. Id. at 41-44.
55. Id. at 43.
56. Id. at 44.
57. Carter v. Dietz, 621 F. Supp. at 536. Jury selection was completed on May 9, 1967.
WICE, supra note 1, at 46. As was the custom, fourteen jurors were selected. Id. at 44. Just
prior to deliberations, two would be randomly eliminated. Id. Of the original fourteen,
only one was black. Id. That juror was one of the two eliminated. Id. The verdicts came
from an all-white jury. Id.
58. WICE, supra note 1, at 44. Jury selection for this trial concluded on November 5,
1976. Id. at 110. This time, two black jurors were placed on the panel. Id. Prior to
deliberations, one black juror was eliminated, leaving one black member of the deciding
jury. Id. at 144.
59. Carter v. Dietz, 621 F. Supp. at 536. Pursuant to Brady v. Maryland, prosecutors
were obligated under the Due Process Clause to disclose material exculpatory evidence
to the defense. 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963). The promise of government leniency to both
eyewitnesses could have been significant evidence with which to impeach their
credibility. The retrial was ordered by the New Jersey Supreme Court. See State v.
Carter, 354 A.2d 627 (N.J. 1976). That same court had rejected Carter's first appeal. See
State v. Carter, 255 A.2d 746 (N.J. 1969). Both Carter and Artis were released on bail,
pending a new trial. WICE, supra note 1, at 101. A number of events between the two
reviews by the New Jersey Supreme Court may or may not have had an impact: A
former police officer took an interest in the case and voluntarily launched his own
investigation. Id. at 75-77. An autobiography that Carter wrote in prison was published
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trial, the defendants were convicted once again, receiving life
sentences.60 For a second time Rubin Carter was sentenced to two
consecutive life terms with a third life term to run concurrently.
61
In a widely publicized sequence of events, Rubin Carter was
released on bail in November 1985 after a federal judge granted his
and Artis's petitions for writs of habeas corpus.62 However, it took
until February 1988 for the Passaic County prosecutor's office to
decide not to seek a third trial.63
The writ was granted on two constitutional grounds64: (1) the
prosecution's unlawful insertion of race and racial tensions into the
trial; and (2) the prosecution's failure to accurately disclose results of
a polygraph test administered to one of the eyewitnesses. A bit of
background on each issue follows.
A. Making Race an Issue
Earlier on the night of the shooting, another shooting occurred
at a different bar in Paterson. At the Waltz Inn, the bar's new
African-American owner was shot and killed by the white man who
sold it to him, ostensibly over an argument about the purchase
payments.65 Shortly thereafter, African-American neighborhood
residents gathered near the Waltz Inn to express their anger over the
killing and demand that the killer be brought to justice. A few drove
by Viking. CARTER, supra note 10. Bello and Bradley gave statements recanting their trial
testimony. WICE, supra note 1, at 79-82. Carter's new lawyers launched a serious
publicity campaign that spurred press coverage, including the New York Times. Id. at 89.
After spending a day talking with Carter in prison, singer Bob Dylan wrote and released
a song describing his plight. See BOB DYLAN, Hurricane, on DESIRE (Columbia Records
1975). The Hurricane Defense Fund was created with Muhammad Ali as its co-chair.
WICE, supra note 1, at 90. Celebrities sponsored a fundraising concert in Madison Square
Garden in December 1975. Id. New Jersey Governor Brendan Byrne authorized an
investigation into the case. Id. at 92.
60. Carter v. Dietz, 621 F. Supp. at 536. The jury rejected the option of the death
penalty and recommended mercy. Id.
61. Id. John Artis' life sentences were all to run concurrently making him eligible for
parole in 1981. Id.; WICE, supra note 1, at 148.
62. Carter v. Dietz, 621 F. Supp. at 560. By this time John Artis had already been
released on parole. Id. at 536. State court appeals following the second trial took many
years and included remands to the trial court for evidentiary hearings on newly
discovered evidence. Id. at 536-37. Nevertheless, in the end the New Jersey Supreme
Court denied all appellate claims. State v. Carter, 449 A.2d 1280 (N.J. 1982).
63. WICE, supra note 1, at 188. For an account of the state's efforts to have the
granting of the writ overturned, see supra note 3.
64. Both pertain to a criminal defendant's right to due process. See U.S. CONST.
amend. V.
65. Carter v. Dietz, 621 F. Supp. at 538; WICE supra note 1, at 3.
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to the police station to get answers.66 There was evidence that Rubin
Carter had spoken with the son-in-law of the Waltz Inn shooting
victim in the hours before the Lafayette incident.67
Despite the fact that the prosecution secured a conviction in
Carter and Artis' first trial without establishing a motive for the
murders, it apparently did not want to take that risk a second time.
Thus, during the second trial, the prosecutors urged the jury to find
that the white victims killed at the Lafayette were killed by African
Americans as "racial" revenge for a white man killing an African
American at the Waltz Inn.68 In his closing argument, the prosecutor
told the jurors that "things like race prejudice and anger and hate for
people because of the different color of their skin exists in this world.
[In 1966,] it was a world filled with people who hate." 69
B. Polygraph Results
Over the course of the nearly ten years between the first and
second trials, Al Bello, who testified against Carter and Artis as an
eyewitness at the first trial, had changed his story more than once.
He had recanted his trial testimony and then recanted the
recantation.70 Needless to say, the government had grounds to
distrust Bello and question whether he would make a credible
witness. Shortly before the second trial, the prosecutor retained a
polygraphist in an effort to get to the truth.71 After administering a
polygraph test to Bello, the examiner told the government attorneys
that Bello was being truthful when he said he was inside the
Lafayette Bar during the shooting. 72 Of course, Bello had already
testified at the first trial that he was outside the bar that night.73
Confusingly, when the polygraphist submitted a written report of
the Bello test he stated, "It is the opinion of the examiner that
66. WICE supra note 1, at 3-4 (stressing that, "as the evening progressed, the
neighborhood emotional state evolved toward sadness rather than bitterness").
67. Carter v. Dietz, 621 F. Supp. at 538. Carter knew Eddie Rawls, the son-in-law,
because at one time Rawls was a member of Carter's training crew. See WICE, supra
note 1, at 4.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 539-40. At the start of his summation, the prosecutor told the jury that the
racial revenge motive was one of six strands of evidence that formed a "rope strong
enough to bring the two murderers to justice." WICE supra note 1, at 143.
70. Carter v. Dietz, 621 F. Supp. at 547.
71. Id. Professor Leonard H. Harrelson was the polygraphist retained by the District
Attorney. Id. The exam was performed on August 7,1976. Id.
72. Id.
73. WICE, supra note 1, at 53.
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[Bello's] 196[7] testimony at the trial was true."74 Whether the
examiner realized it or not, this conflicted with his oral report. The
oral report was not disclosed to defense counsel before the second
trial. This formed the basis for the second due process violation
found by the federal habeas corpus court.75
III. Access to Federal Relief -Then and Now
Carter and Artis' habeas corpus petitions were heard by United
States District Court Judge H. Lee Sarokin.76 He granted them relief
in November 1985. At the time, Judge Sarokin was required by law
to review the petitioners' constitutional claims about their state court
convictions, de novo.77 In other words, he was to independently
apply federal law to the facts and decide if, in his view, there was a
constitutional violation. Many aspects of habeas corpus law
changed when the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act
("AEDPA") was signed into law by President Clinton in 1996.78 One
of, if not the most significant change was the elimination of de novo
review.79 Today, federal courts must give a measure of deference to
the state court's resolution of federal issues.8 0 Fearing the difficulties
of retrials, which often occur many years after a crime was
committed, states' rights champions in Congress pushed AEDPA
through partly due to concerns that federal judges were too eager to
74. WICE, supra note 1, at 157; See also State v. Carter, 449 A.2d 1280, 1306 (1982)
(Clifford J., dissenting).
75. Carter v. Dietz, 621 F. Supp. at 558.
76. Judge Sarokin was originally appointed to the federal bench by President Jimmy
Carter and then later to the Court of Appeals by President Bill Clinton. He retired in
1996. See http://www.huffingtonpost.com/judge-h-lee-sarokin/ (last visited Aug. 6,
2014). He is a regular contributor to the Huffington Post, writing on legal issues and
their impact on society. See e.g., H. Lee Sarokin, For Sale -Going Fast: An Independent
Judiciary- Buy a Judge Today, HUFFINGTON POST, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/judge
-h-lee-sarokin/judicial-elections b_5655959.html (Aug. 07, 2014); H. Lee Sarokin, On and
Off Executions Are Unconstitutional, HUFFINGTON POST, http://www.huffingtonpost
.com/judge-h-lee-sarokin/on-and-off-executions-are b 5599631.html (July 18, 2014).
77. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 506-07 (1953).
78. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132,
110 Stat. 1214.
79. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (d)(1) (1996).
80. Id. (providing "An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person
in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to
any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the
adjudication of the claim -resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an
unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the
Supreme Court of the United States"). For an explanation of how this provision has been
interpreted by the Supreme Court, see infra notes 92-97 and accompanying text.
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upset a state court's judgment.81 Ironically, in the Carter case, Judge
Sarokin began his decision lamenting the fact that he could not
simply defer to the state court. He said, "It is tempting to presume
the correctness of those [reviews by state courts] rulings, but this
court is charged to resist such temptation lest it fail in its duty to
independently analyze the constitutional violations asserted in the
petitions for habeas relief."82 Judge Sarokin's independent review
led to Rubin Carter's freedom. Today, even with the same facts,
such a result would likely be prohibited under AEDPA.
First, consider the claim that the prosecution's insertion of a
"racial tension theme" was misconduct serious enough to violate the
defendants' rights to due process of law. In his analysis, Judge
Sarokin began by simply noting that the New Jersey Supreme Court
rejected the claim.83 He then independently analyzed it. Noting that
while racially motivated revenge could in theory motivate murder,
there must be sufficient evidence that it occurred because of this
claim's potentially inflammatory effect on a jury.84 Then Judge
Sarokin painstakingly examined the record and highlighted all of the
evidence that arguably linked Carter and Artis with a possible racial
revenge motive.85  He went on to question the prosecutors'
assumptions about racial tension and hostility.86 Applying federal
legal precedent 87 to the facts, Judge Sarokin ruled that the due
81. See generally Judicial Conference of the U.S., Ad Hoc Comm. on Fed. Habeas Corpus
in Capital Cases, Comm. Report and Proposal 11 (1989), reprinted in Habeas Corpus Legislation:
Hearings on H.R. 4737, H.R. 1090, H.R. 1953, and H.R. 32584 Before the H. Subcomm. on Courts,
Intellectual Prop., and the Admin. of Justice of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong. 46 (1990);
Judith L. Ritter, The Voice of Reason - Why Recent Judicial Interpretations of the Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act's Restrictions on Habeas Corpus Are Wrong, 37 SEATTLE L. REV. 55,58-
60, 72-75 (2013).
82. Carter v. Dietz, 621 F. Supp. at 534. Consistent with his implication in Carter's
case that federal judges have no true incentive to free state prisoners for no good reason,
Judge Sarokin later commented that "the charge that a number of federal judges
infiltrated the judiciary and are willy-nilly freeing criminals is reminiscent of the
McCarthy-era charges that vast numbers of Communists had invaded the executive
branch of our government and were plotting against it. It is a myth created by politicians
for political purposes and is ludicrous." H. Lee Sarokin, Thwarting the Will of the Majority,
20 WHITTIER L. REV. 171, 176 (1998).
83. Carter v. Dietz, 621 F. Supp. at 539 (stating "The New Jersey Supreme Court also
rejected petitioner's claims that the interjection of the racial revenge motive, and the
state's summation of that motive, was an unacceptable appeal to racial prejudice, and as
such violated their due process rights to a fair trial.").
84. Id. at 540.
85. Id. at 541-42.
86. Id. at 543-44.
87. Then and now, the law regarding when prosecutorial misconduct establishes a
due process violation, places a heavy burden on the claimant. See Donnelley vs.
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process claim should have been sustained 88 and that the error was
not harmless.8 9 He wrote, "An appeal to racial prejudice and bias
must be deplored in any jury trial and certainly where charges of
murder are involved." 90
Today, under AEDPA and case law interpreting its provisions,
both the analysis and result would look very different.91 Habeas
corpus law currently requires a federal court to start its review with
deference to the state court's resolution of the federal question.
Section 2254 (d)(1) of Title 28 of the United States Code prohibits the
granting of relief unless the state court's decision was "contrary to or
involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal
law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States." 92 To
establish the point of this Article, it is unnecessary to lay out the
evolution of the jurisprudence regarding the meanings and the
difference between meanings of the "contrary to" and "the
unreasonable application" clauses.93 Suffice it to say that today
Rubin Carter would have to convince a federal court not only that
the New Jersey Supreme Court was wrong in its application of
federal law - which is what Judge Sarokin found - but that beyond
wrong, it was unreasonable in its application of Supreme Court case
DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 642 (1974) (stating "Not every trial error or infirmity which
might call for application of supervisory powers correspondingly constitutes a 'failure to
observe that fundamental fairness essential to the very concept of justice"'). See generally
James Joseph Duane, What Message Are We Sending Criminal Trial Jurors When We Ask
Them to "Send a Message" With Their Verdict?, 22 AM. J. CRIM. L. 565, 634-35 (1.995)
(writing of high standard that must be met to show a due process violation).
88. Carter v. Dietz, 621 F. Supp. at 545-46.
89. Id. at 546.
90. Id. at 547. Judge Sarokin dismissed the prosecution's justification for using this
theme by saying, "The death of the stepfather of the petitioners' friend, standing alone,
would never explain why petitioners would shoot four innocent persons who were
strangers to them. Notwithstanding the lack of any evidence that petitioners had a
background of racial animosity against whites or had any such feelings after the specific
death involved, the prosecutor was permitted to render the illogical logical by relying
upon petitioners' blackness and the victims' whiteness." Id. at 546-47.
91. AEDPA's statute of limitations would likely have prevented Carter and Artis from
filing a petition in federal court at all, much less prevailed. See generally 28 U.S.C. §
2244(d)(1) (1996) (requiring the filing of habeas corpus petitions within one year of the date
upon which the conviction became final and post-conviction challenges in state court have
been exhausted). Unless Carter could successfully argue that the statute should have been
tolled, his petition filed in 1985 was well outside of the one-year limitations period. See
Stephen B. Bright, Does The Bill of Rights Apply Here Any More? Evisceration of Habeas Corpus
and Denial of Counsel To Those Under Sentence of Death, 20 Nov. CHAMPION 25, 25 (1996). See
also Anthony Lewis, Why The Courts, 22 CARDOZO L. REV. 133, 146 (2000).
92. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (1996).
93. See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-09 (2000); Ritter, supra note 81, at 60-70.
[Vol. 12
AFTER THE HURRICANE
law. Breaking it down, the review would go as follows 94: (1) What
did the New Jersey Supreme Court decide and what was its
rationale? 95 (2) Even if I (federal district court judge) disagree with
the state's legal conclusion, I must decide if that holding was
unreasonable. (3) A state court's ruling is only unreasonable if no
fair-minded jurist could agree with it.96 (4) In assessing the
unreasonableness of the state court's application of law, I may only
utilize clearly established United States Supreme Court (as opposed
to all federal courts) precedent 97 as it existed at the time of the state
court's consideration of the case. 98 (5) Was the constitutional error
harmless?99
There is little or no chance that Carter and Artis could win relief
under current standards. The New Jersey Supreme Court denied their
constitutional claims by a vote of 4-3.100 This means that a favorable
decision by a federal court would imply that the four New Jersey
Supreme Court Justices that rejected the claims were not fair-minded
jurists.
The same would be true for the Brady due process claim. Ever
since Brady v. Maryland was decided in 1963, prosecutors must
disclose exculpatory material evidence within the state's control.101
The polygraphist's oral report that Al Bello's statement to him that
94. In addition to the new standard of review and a one year statute of limitations,
AEDPA's provisions bar claims where state remedies have not been exhausted, unless
the state affirmatively waives the requirement or the petitioner has previously filed for a
federal writ of habeas corpus. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) & (c); 28 U.S.C. § 2244. The
likelihood of securing an evidentiary hearing in federal court was greatly diminished by
AEDPA as well. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2); Bright, supra note 4, at 23-24. See also Cullen
v. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. 1388 (2011) (holding that the federal habeas corpus court may
only rely on the record that was before the state court).
95. The New Jersey Supreme Court's decision contained its rationale for denying
Carter's appeal. See State v. Carter, 449 A.2d 1280 (N.J. 1982). In 2011, the United States
Supreme Court ruled that AEDPA's required deference applies even when the state
court's decision is a summary one, i.e., contains no rationale, just a summary denial. See
Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 784 (2011) (holding that, "where a state court's
decision is unaccompanied by an explanation, the habeas petitioner's burden still must
be met by showing there was no reasonable basis for the state court to deny relief"). See
also Johnson v. Williams, 133 S. Ct. 1088, 1091 (2013) (holding that Richter's presumption
that summary state court denials were adjudications on the merits applies where state
court ruled on some, but not all of Petitioner's claims).
96. Richter, 562 U.S. at 180.
97. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).
98. Greene v. Fisher, 132 S. Ct. 38, 44 (2011).
99. For the harmless error standard applicable to federal habeas corpus proceedings
under section 2254, see Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619 (1993).
100. State v. Carter, 449 A.2d 1280 (N.J. 1982).
101. 373 U.S. 83, 97 (1963).
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he was inside the Lafayette Bar during the shootings was true
qualifies as Brady material because it bears on Bello's credibility as a
witness.10 2 Prior to their second trial, the defendants had specifically
requested all information relating to the polygraph testing, but the
oral report had not been disclosed. 0 3 Despite this, a majority of the
New Jersey Supreme Court found no Brady violation based on its
opinion that while exculpatory, the report was not material in that
defendants failed to show that its disclosure might have affected the
outcome of the trial.104 Judge Sarokin disagreed with the state
court's materiality analysis.105 Finding that "materiality" was a
mixed question of law and fact, Judge Sarokin reviewed the question
de novo.10 6 His opinion that the state court got it wrong was a
sufficient basis upon which to grant habeas relief. 07 That would not
be the case today. Unless Judge Sarokin went so far as to find that it
was not a question upon which fair-minded jurists could disagree,
the Brady error he found would bring no remedy. As was the case
for the racial revenge claim, the state court split 4-3 on the Brady
issue.108 Again, relief could not be granted absent an implication
that the four justices in the majority with whom Judge Sarokin
disagreed were not fair-minded jurists.
The probable result for the Brady question under current law is
especially alarming. By the time the issue was heard in federal
court, the United States Supreme Court's definition of "material" for
Brady purposes had been refined. In fact, the newer standard made
it somewhat more difficult for a defendant to establish that the
withheld evidence was material. 0 9 Judge Sarokin applied the new,
tougher standard but found the evidence to be sufficiently material
102. United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 (1976).
103. Carter v. Dietz, 621 F. Supp. at 548.
104. State v. Carter, 449 A.2d at 1297. At that time, the United States Supreme
Court's standard for materiality under Brady, when the defense has made a specific
request for non-disclosed evidence was that "material" meant the evidence might have
affected the outcome. See Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 (1976).
105. Carter v. Dietz, 621 F. Supp. at 558.
106. Id. at 551.
107. It was unnecessary for Judge Sarokin to undertake a harmless error analysis.
The materiality standard in effect when Judge Sarokin decided the Carter case meant that
if the withheld evidence was material, its non-disclosure could not, by definition, be
harmless. See infra note 109 and accompanying text.
108. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
109. Shortly before Judge Sarokin ruled in Carter, the United States Supreme Court
refined the Brady materiality standard. In United States v. Bagley, the Court decided that
regardless of the nature of the request for exculpatory evidence (whether specific,
general or no request), non-disclosed evidence would be considered material if there is a
"reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of
the proceeding would have been different." 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985).
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to warrant relief nevertheless.11 0 Thus, if Rubin Carter's habeas
petition were decided today, he would likely be denied relief even
though a federal court judge agreed his rights were violated using a
standard even more stringent than the one used by the state court.
In other words, Carter might overcome the high standard set to
prove a due process violation which in theory signifies a serious
deprivation, yet still remain imprisoned if a single fair-minded jurist
could agree with the state court's conclusion.111
Another significant change brought by AEDPA raises an
additional reason that Rubin Carter would likely have lost in court,
had that been the governing law. Under AEDPA, a federal habeas
court may only look to United State Supreme Court precedent when
adjudging the correctness and reasonableness of a state court's
decision.112 For both of the due process claims - improper appeal to
racial prejudice and withholding of exculpatory evidence-Judge
Sarokin applied case law from several United States Circuit Courts
of Appeals in addition to the Supreme Court.113 He would not be
permitted to do that today.
IV. Why the Comparison is Significant
Rubin Carter won his freedom in federal court, but not because
the court found he was innocent.1 4 Some, therefore, may not be
disturbed by the fact that he would likely not get relief under current
110. It should be noted that today under AEDPA, if the legal standard had become
more favorable to a criminal defendant, it could not be applied by the federal court. The
federal habeas court must apply Supreme Court precedent as it was at the time the state
court reviewed the case. See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
111. While tangential to the point made here, it should be noted that in 1995, the United
States Supreme Court cast doubt on whether polygraph results could qualify as material
evidence under Brady, when they are inadmissible under state evidentiary laws. See Wood
v. Bartholomew, 516 U.S. 1, 6 (1995). However, the opinion in Wood left room for a
claimant's convincing argument that polygraph results or other forms of inadmissible
evidence could be material if, despite their inadmissibility, they could have led to the
discovery of admissible evidence or provided the foundation for cross-examination which
might have affected the outcome. Id. at 8. See generally United States v. Morales, 746 F.3d
310, 314-16 (7th Cir. 2014) (providing comprehensive overview of differences amongst
Circuits regarding Brady materiality analysis with regard to the non-disclosure of
inadmissible exculpatory evidence). Thus for reasons unrelated to a change in the law of
habeas corpus, the analysis of Carter's Brady claim would look quite different today.
112. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (1996).
113. See e.g., Carter v. Dietz, 621 F. Supp. at 544-45 (citing decisions from the Fourth,
Second, Tenth and Sixth Circuit Courts of Appeals), 550 (citing decision of the Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit).
114. Although as noted above, Judge Sarokin would later indicate that he believed
that Carter was probably innocent. Sarokin, supra note 3.
Winter 2015] AFTER THE HURRICANE
HASTINGS RACE & POVERTY LAW JOURNAL
law. After all, prior to his litigating in federal court, Carter's due
process claims were heard and rejected by state trial and appellate
courts. Many argue that our system does not need to provide
multiple avenues to reargue claims of criminal procedure error at the
expense of the perceived benefits of finality. 115 This perspective
misses an important point. When errors of criminal procedure
invalidate a conviction, it means that the trial was unfair.1 16 This is
not a mere technicality. A verdict following an unfair trial is an
unreliable one.117 The trial is where facts are found and witnesses'
credibilities are evaluated, ostensibly causing the truth to come out.
When rules of criminal procedure are violated, such as those barring
unfair prejudice or guaranteeing the right to counsel and due
process of law, the jury's decision and/or the public's impression
about guilt cannot be presumed correct.
Rubin Carter's victory in federal court provides a concrete
example. According to the court, his due process rights were
violated in two ways. Once, the prosecutor improperly urged the
jury to find that the black defendants committed three murders in
order to seek revenge against white people in general. This made
the trial unfair as a matter of law because an appeal to racial
prejudice and fears can cause jurors to be distracted to the extent
that they cannot be impartial. If they cannot impartially judge facts,
the criminal procedure violation is much more than a technical error.
On the contrary, the error casts serious doubt on the correctness of
the jury's verdict. Secondly, the federal court found that the
prosecution unconstitutionally withheld exculpatory evidence: the
oral polygraph results. Again, this bears on the reliability of the
jury's fact-finding ability. Purported eyewitness Al Bello's credibility
was a key issue in the Carter-Artis trial. Bello told the jury that he was
outside the Lafayette Bar on the night of the murders. The
prosecution's violation meant that the defense counsel was deprived of
ammunition with which to attack this testimony. If not for the Brady
violation, the jury could have learned that Bello's trial testimony was
suspect. As with the racial motive due process violation, this error
interfered with the jury's access to fact-finding related evidence. Thus,
115. See e.g., Paul M. Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State
Prisoners, 76 HARV. L. REV. 441 (1963); Daniel E. Lungren & Mark L. Krotoski, Public Policy
Lessons from The Robert Alton Harris Case, 40 UCLA L. REv. 295 (1992); 141 CONG. REC. S7822-23
(daily ed. June 7,1995) (statements of Sen. Abraham); id. at S7829 (statements of Sen. Kyl).
116. Errors not significant enough to impact fairness or reliability, will not justify
a reversal. See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967); Harrington v. California, 395
U.S. 250 (1969).
117. See Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85, 86-87 (1962).
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the criminal procedure violation casts doubt on the correctness of the
guilty verdicts.
The same concerns regarding verdict accuracy arise with regard
to any number of constitution-based criminal procedure violations.
It may be obvious that when false evidence is introduced or
exculpatory evidence suppressed, a jury has been misinformed and
thus its verdict is untrustworthy. 118 However, there are less direct
ways in which trial procedure can taint the results. For example,
improprieties during jury selection impact the correctness of a verdict.
The law prohibits racial, ethnic and gender discrimination in the use
of peremptory challenges. 19  When this rule is violated, the
composition of the jury may be unfairly balanced for or against a
particular population group. This in turn creates a risk that prejudice
may influence fact-finding, which creates a risk of the jury reaching an
unreliable verdict. Thus, when current federal habeas corpus law cuts
off a state prisoner's access to federal court, this is far more significant
than it might seem. Beyond cutting off the ability for a constitutional
issue to be correctly resolved, it can and does120 create a risk of
punishing or even executing the innocent. If Rubin Carter was
innocent, which is widely believed to be the case, and current law
would have barred an independent review by the federal courts,
rather than being freed after nineteen years he would have died in
prison in his seventies. This is deeply troubling.121
The seismic122 changes to federal habeas corpus law brought by
118. The only exception is for situations in which the improperly admitted or
excluded evidence is deemed harmless in light of all of the evidence at trial.
119. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986) (addressing race discrimination);
Hemandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352 (1991) (addressing ethnic discrimination); J.E.B. v.
Alabama, 511 U.S. 127 (1994) (addressing gender discrimination). These cases were
decided under the Equal Protection Clause and were all decided after Rubin Carter's trials.
120. For the results of an empirical study documenting the high percentage of federal
habeas corpus petitions in which the federal court found reversible constitutional error, see
generally JAMES S. LIEBMAN, JEFFREY FAGAN, AND VALERIE WEST, A BROKEN SYSTEM: ERROR
RATES IN CAPITAL CASES, 1973-1995 (Columbia University School of Law 2000).
121. See Bright, supra note 91.
122. While in the early years of AEDPA, it did not appear that it would have the impact
many feared, after a time the decreased availability of habeas corpus relief was noticeable. See
Justin F. Marceau, Challenging the Habeas Process Rather Than The Result, 69 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 85, 87-105 (2012) (presenting data that subsequent to a study completed in 2006,
AEDPA's "bite" has gotten much worse and referring to the earlier post-AEDPA years as "a
sort of AEDPA grace period"); Lynn Adelman, The Great Writ Diminished, 35 NEw ENG. J. ON
CRIM. & Civ. CONFINEMENT 3, 6 (2009) (noting that "the grant rate is now so low that it can no
longer be reasonably asserted that habeas corpus functions as 'the greatest of the safeguards
of personal liberty embodied in the common law'"). Much of the change can be attributed to
the Supreme Court's interpretations of ambiguous statutory language regarding the standard
of review. See Ritter, supra note 81, at 56-57, 65-70.
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AEDPA are not widely known, much less, understood, by the
public. 123 AEDPA contained significant amendments to the Judiciary
Act of 1867, which extended the remedy of a federal writ of habeas
corpus to inmates convicted in state courts.1 24 The Supreme Court
has recognized that in passing the Judiciary Act of 1867, Congress
designated the federal courts as insurers of the constitutional rights
of state court detainees.1 25 AEDPA's curtailment of habeas corpus
passed through Congress in the wake of the 1995 bombing of the
Alfred P. Murrah federal building in Oklahoma City.126 It is not
uncommon for legislators to recognize politically opportune
moments for pushing through what would at other times be highly
controversial changes to the law.127 Members of Congress who
might otherwise vigorously oppose these measures 128 would
understandably be less likely to do so while the country was
contemplating the swiftness and effectiveness of punishment for
those responsible for the Oklahoma City terrorist bombing1 29 Now,
123. Lewis, supra note 91, at 149 (noting that "when Congress crippled federal habeas
corpus, there were few meaningful reports in the press, much less on television"). Rubin
Carter himself expressed astonishment at the lack of pushback to AEDPA. When speaking at
a symposium nearly fifteen years after his release, in referring to AEDPA he lamented, "Why
don't we realize that by taking away our access to habeas corpus we are being robbed of
something as real as money and far more valuable? Why aren't the burglar alarms
sounding?" See Symposium, Gideon - A Generation Later, 58 MD. L. REv. 1333,1390 (1999).
124. Act of Feb. 5, 1867, Stat. 385.
125. Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 10 (1984) (citing Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 242
(1972)) (stating that "there can be no doubt that in enacting § 2254, [extending federal
habeas corpus to state court prisoners] Congress sought to 'interpose the federal courts
between the States and the people, as guardians of the people's federal rights - to protect
the people from unconstitutional action"'). The reasons this safeguard was deemed
necessary fit loosely into two categories: (1) the federal judiciary has superior knowledge
of and experience with federal constitutional law; and (2) state court jurists may be more
susceptible to political influences and/or prejudice.
126. One hundred and sixty-eight people were killed, including nineteen children.
See Terror Hits Home: The Oklahoma City Bombing, F.B.I., http://www.fbi.gov/about-
us/history/famous-cases/oklahoma-city-bombing (last visited Aug. 23, 2014).
127. See generally Amos N. Guiora, Legislative and Policy Responses to Terrorism, A
Global Perspective, 7 SAN DIEGO INT'L L.J. 125, 130, 134 (2005).
128. See 142 CONG. REC. H3602 (daily ed. Apr. 18, 1996) (statement of Rep. Gekas)
(remarking, "It took us a generation to convince the people on the left that we ought to
have a workable, reassurable, predictable death penalty that would inexorably exact the
punishment that was intended").
129. See generally 141 CONG. REC. S7821 (daily ed. June 7, 1996) (statements of Sen.
Nickles) (mentioning that one of his constituents whose husband was killed in the
Oklahoma City bombing told him that her pain would "be much greater if the
perpetrators were allowed to sit on death row for many years"); 142 CONG. REC. H3602
(daily ed. Apr. 18, 1996) (statements of Rep. Gekas) (stressing that the bill is necessary to
ensure that death sentences handed down by juries in cases like the Oklahoma City
bombing case will not be set aside or delayed by frivolous appeals). Notwithstanding
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almost twenty years after AEDPA was enacted, it is difficult to
imagine anyone persuasively arguing that the habeas corpus
restrictions have made us safer from violent acts, much less from
acts of terrorism. They have, however, made us much less safe from
the danger of wrongful convictions.
It is time to engage in a new dialogue concerning the injustice of
curtailing federal habeas corpus. I can think of no better legacy for
Rubin "Hurricane" Carter than his ordeal and his work on behalf of
others spurring the restoration of access to meaningful federal
review. Moreover, the need for the reform or repeal of AEDPA's
section 2254 provisions is urgent. Last year, this author wrote that
the latest Supreme Court interpretations of 2254(d)(1) have nearly
"obliterated the Great Writ in the arena of federal review of state
court convictions." 130 It is not simply that it is more difficult to win
relief in federal court, but rather, it is nearly impossible.131 Now is
the time to "sound the... alarm," as Rubin Carter urged.132 Carter
fought for change from his deathbed. 33 He feared that people
would "forget that laws critically affect human lives." 134 Perhaps
upon his death, the "story of the Hurricane" 35 will be a call to
revitalize federal oversight of the rights of all criminal defendants.
political pressures, there were members of Congress who did voice opposition to
AEDPA's habeas provisions. See e.g. 142 CONG. REC. H3601 (statement of Rep. Kennedy)
(stating, "Habeas corpus has nothing to do with an antiterrorism bill"). See also remarks
of Congressman Watt of North Carolina that, "we cannot sacrifice our constitutional
principles because we are angry at people for bombing"; 142 CONG. REC. H3602
(statement of Rep. Watt); 141 Cong. Rec. S7808-09 (daily ed. June 7, 1995) (statement of
Sen. Kennedy) (complaining that AEDPA, "goes far beyond terrorism and far beyond
Federal prisoners. It is wrong to try to sneak [limits on access to habeas writs by state
prisoners] into an antiterrorism bill that we all want to pass as quickly as possible").
130. See Ritter, supra note 81, at 56.
131. Id. at 77-80.
132. See supra, note 123 and accompanying text.
133. See supra, note 6 and accompanying text.
134. Panel Discussion: Human Rights and Human Wrongs: Is the United States Death
Penalty System Inconsistent With International Human Rights Law?, 67 FORDHAM L. REV.
2793, 2808 (1999).
135. See Dylan, supra note 10.
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